Eurojournal.org provides space for debates on recent developments related to the resolution of the conflict in Transnistria. An interview with Nicu Popescu in the newspaper "Vremea" refers to the positive and negative aspects of the Ukrainian plan.

Nicu Popescu
Interview with the newspaper “Vremea”, http://www.vremea.net
Chisinau, 27 May, 2005 (published in Russian).


Vremea: What is you assessment of the Ukrainian Plan on Transnistria?

Nicu Popescu: Interesting and useful in some respects, but not answering a number of crucial questions. The plan looks more like a collection of steps and elements that might contribute to conflict resolution in Transnistria, but I don’t see them as being enough for solving the problem. The Ukrainian plan raises a number of useful issues, and it should be treated as such, rather than a comprehensive agreement that would settle the conflict once and for all. And the plan has to go in parallel with concrete actions on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.

Vremea: What are some of the positive and negative traits of the Ukrainian plan, when compared to previous proposals?

NP: As I said the plan is not a holistic vision of the conflict resolution process, but is a collection of elements. That is why I will comment on some of the elements of the plan. First, it drops the term “federation”, but uses the term “Republic” for the Transnistrian entity. In any case what matters most is be the division of competences in an eventually reunified Moldova, rather than the name of it. Second, the current plan has a rather limited list of joint competences for the reunified state. However, these will be determined by direct negotiations later on. And as the example of the Joint Constitutional Commission showed in 2003, such negotiations can always be blocked and used to maintain a status quo while pretending that a party is interested in talks. That is why actions to make the status quo untenable are crucial for the success of the plan. Third, it shifts the centre of gravity of negotiations to the parliaments of Moldova and Transnistria. It states that the status of Transnistria will be discussed in a parliamentary commission formed by Moldovan and Transnistrian deputies. That is a move towards treating Transnistria as a collection of various forces, rather than considering Smirnov as a true and legitimate leader of the region. Indeed, the current efforts by Transnistrian deputies lead by deputy speaker Shevchuk shows that Transnistria should not be treated as a unitary actor with only one possible interlocutor there. There are many interlocutors there, and one should involve them as well in the talks on the future of Transnistria. Fourth, the negotiations are transferred on a moldo-transnistrian platform, rather than in the five-sided format. Fifth, the biggest weaknesses of the plan is that it does not provide for mechanisms for changing the status quo around Transnistria, and Ukraine is a key actor in any such efforts. In addition, it raises the prospect of the Transnistria regime becoming legitimized as a result of internationally observed elections which will almost surely would confirm Smirnov in his position. Nobody needs another Belarus or a Milosevic’s Serbia, but this time with internationally recognized leadership under Smirnov. This would not serve the conflict resolution process.

Vremea: So far Moldova has rejected most of the proposals on conflict settlement in Transnistria put forward by third parties. But this time Moldova has declared its readiness to start implementing this plan even before it is formally signed. How do you explain this?

Moldova did not reject all the plans. There was just no plans leading to a sustainable resolution of the conflict. Any plans are not values in itself. They should be designed to solve problems, and if they don’t, they should not be accepted. Neither the Kozak Memorandum nor the Kiev Document did not solve the problems that originate from Transnistria, that is why they were rejected. Why this plan is accepted this time? Because it is a collection of potentially useful elements coming form a partner that is absolutely crucial in changing the situation around Transnistria. But the plan should create the conditions for concrete actions, not replace these concrete actions.

Vremea: The Ukrainian plan mentions Russia as a crucial actor in the settlement process. Why is Russia lukewarm towards the plan?

NP: Russia does not trust anybody in the whole equation. It does not trust the “Orange” Ukraine, Moldova, the EU, the US, nor the OSCE. That is why it ends up supporting regimes like that of Lukashenka, Karimov or Smirnov. This is against Russian interests and Russia’s desire to become a modern, European, democratic and powerful state, but many Russian decision makers got locked into a defensive and confrontational logic which only diminishes Russia. It is happening because Russia perceives all the changes in the new Europe as directed against its spheres of interests. It fails to see that the real changes are happening at the levels of societies in Eastern Europe and former soviet Union, not in imagined geopolitical battles. Russia is trying to adapt to the situation but many of its reflexes are inspired but conservatism, not by Russian interests in the long run. However, the situation is changing. On May 10 the EU and Russia signed a road map on the creation of a common space of external security. It mentions the objective of “promoting conflict settlement through mutual result-oriented cooperation… in support of efforts in agreed formats”. Transnistria will be a test where, how and based on what values the common space for external security will be built. Results matter more than formats.

Vremea: It seems like the plan is clear about the inclusion of the EU and US in the negotiating format…

NP: The plan is rather vague on that. It refers to Russia, Ukraine ad OSCE as “mediators” (posredniki) and “guarantors”, while the EU and the US will only send “representatives” (predstaviteli) to the negotiating format and will only contribute to conflict resolution, rather mediate and guarantee. The result is that the US and the EU are asked to eventually legitimize elections in Transnistria, and the elaboration of a new agreement, while having a formal role that is inferior to that of Russia or Ukraine. This is both unacceptable and dangerous. It also fails to reflect the reality that in two years Transnistria will be on the border of the EU, and it is very far from Russia. Transnistria is not a Russian problem, it is a European problem and a problem for Ukraine.

Vremea: Are there any differences between Washington and Brussels’s approaches to the conflict in Transnistria? Should we expect only positive effects from the inclusion into the conflict settlement of these two actors?

NP: The Transnistria problem has been a case of very good cooperation between the US and the EU. A joint EU-Us approach is absolutely crucial for the success of the conflict resolution in Transnistria. Former US ambassador to Moldova Pamela Hyde Smith wrote in a recent paper that Moldova cannot solve the problem on its own because it lacks leverage on Transnistria, Russia and Ukraine. Greater EU and US involvement would be crucial to offset this weakness of Moldova. They are also crucial to supporting Moldova’s transformation, democratization and reform which is the main conflict resolution tool Moldova has. However, one should not expect that EU and US will entirely adopt Moldova’s view of the conflict. But, very much like Moldova they want the problem solved.

Your opinion that Moldova, with the help of the EU should concentrate on democratization and economic reform in order to become attractive for Transnistrians is known. The new Ukrainian initiative also has democratization at its core. Is this that basis that would appeal and could re-unite Moldova and Transnistria?

NP: Moldova and Transnistria should reunite on the basis of interest of their citizens, not on the basis of some grand geopolitical schemes. I am sure that both peoples on both banks of Nistru want to leave in prosperous societies where what they think determines what those in powers do. Attractiveness of the Moldovan state for ordinary Moldovans and Transnistrians is the main thing that can be done to solve the conflict. Diplomatic agreements matter less in the conflict resolution process if the preconditions for a settlement are not in place. Thus all the efforts of the international community, should be concentrated on changing the status quo around Transnistria and helping Moldova’s transformation. Moldova’s main conflict-resolution tools are economic reforms, a good business climate and deeper and faster democratisation. If Moldova is not attractive to Transnistrians - no plans and no pressures will reunite the two banks of river Nistru.